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A Vote for Europe?  
The 2019 EP Election from the Voters’ Perspective 
by 
Edgar Grande and Guillem Vidal 
In this paper we analyze the 2019 EP elections from the voters’ perspective. 
It is based on a novel post-electoral survey covering five North West Euro-
pean countries: Austria, Germany, France, Sweden and the UK. In particular 
we address the following questions: How important were the lead candi-
dates in the election campaign? Which issues were most important for vot-
ers? How do these issues relate to voters’ political preferences and ideologi-
cal orientations? Our findings show that the Spitzenkandidaten process 
failed to effectively connect European party groups with their voters. 
Moreover, our analysis reveals that voters had clear issue priorities, which 
reflected, to a considerable extent, the new cleavage structure which has 
been shaping party competition in North West European countries in the 
last two decades.  




Introduction: The EP election 2019 in public debates 
In public debates after election day(s), many commentators interpreted the out-
comes of the European Parliamentary elections in May 2019 as a vote for Europe 
in general and as confirming the importance of lead candidates, the so-called 
Spitzenkandidaten in particular. Several factors contributed to this positive as-
sessment: turnout increased by 8 per cent from 42.6 to 50.6 per cent; the elec-
toral performance of radical populist right and Eurosceptic parties was less im-
pressive than expected (despite successes in major countries such as France, Ita-
ly and the UK); and rather, the pro-European Liberal and Green Parties were con-
sidered the ‘winners’ of this election. Even though the main parties of the mod-
erate right and left – the European Peoples Party (EPP) and the Social Democrats 
(more precisely, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Social Democrats; 
S&D) – lost their dominant position, the new European Parliament has a clear 
pro-European majority. According to the predominant view, the EU’s multiple 
crises – namely, the Brexit crisis, the Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis – 
mobilized new support for Europe among citizens, rather than intensifying ex-
isting divides over European integration. Contrary to previous elections – the 
2014 elections in particular – the EP elections in 2019 seemed to be good news 
for the European integration project. Against this background, the European 
Council’s refusal to nominate one of the lead candidates of the European party 
groups as president of the European Commission has been criticized as a major 
setback for establishing a successful electoral democracy in the EU.  
Are these positive assessments justified? Were the results of the EP elections in 
May 2019 really a vote for Europe and for the Spitzenkandidaten? In the follow-
ing, we present the results of a representative cross-national online survey of 
voters which was conducted on behalf of our DFG-project “Conflict structuring in 
European Elections” with financial support from the WZB.1 The survey covers 
                                                 
1 The project is directed by Edgar Grande and Daniela Braun at the LMU Munich and the WZB Berlin. It has 
been funded by the German Research Council since 2016.  
 
3 
five North West European countries: Austria, France, Germany, Sweden and the 
UK.2 Comparative studies have shown that these countries are representative for 
the ‘macro region’ of North Western Europe (see Kriesi 2016; Hutter and Kriesi 
2019). Empirical research on these countries has provided important insights 
into the restructuring of political conflict in Western Europe (Kriesi et al. 2008; 
2012) and into the politicization of the European integration process (Hutter, 
Grande, and Kriesi 2016). We should be cautious with generalizations for Eastern 
and Southern Europe. Since our sample includes core countries of the EU such as 
France and Germany, our findings should nevertheless be of more general inter-
est for scholars of European politics and European integration. 
In this article, we focus our presentation of results on the importance of candi-
dates and issues in the 2019 EP elections. In particular, we address the following 
questions: How important were the lead candidates in the election campaign? 
Which issues were most important for voters? How do these issues relate to vot-
ers’ political preferences and ideological orientations? Our findings suggest that 
lead candidates failed to establish an effective electoral connection between vot-
ers and European party groups. Rather, new cleavage issues were of high im-
portance for voters. 
 
Lead candidates and the electoral connection between voters and parties 
The nomination of lead candidates by the European party groups in the 2014 EP 
elections has been considered a major ‘democratic innovation’ in the EU’s politi-
cal system (Hobolt 2014; Christiansen 2016). The personalization of EP election 
campaigns is expected to have several positive effects: it should mobilize Euro-
pean citizens, thus increasing turnout; it should intensify the link between par-
ties and voters by giving European party groups a face; and, not least, the ap-
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 Technical details of the survey can be found in section A.1 in the appendix. 
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pointment of a successful lead candidate as president of the European Commis-
sion should strengthen the democratic legitimacy of supranational institutions. 
However, research on the 2014 elections has shown that the first attempt to 
boost electoral democracy by nominating lead candidates did not live up to ex-
pectations. Although the European Council appointed the lead candidate of the 
largest party group as Commission president, the Spitzenkandidaten process only 
had a minor effect on voter mobilization (Schmitt, Hobolt, and Popa 2015). Out-
side their respective countries of origin, the public visibility of lead candidates 
was low, and national parties made little efforts to emphasize these candidates 
in their manifestos and public communications (see, e.g., Schmitt, Hobolt, and 
Popa 2015; Braun and Popa 2018; Braun and Schwarzbözl 2019). In sum, this re-
search shows that parties, for good reasons, hardly made use of the new oppor-
tunities to connect to their voters.  
Was the EP election campaign in 2019 different in this regard? Was the second 
attempt to nominate lead candidates more successful? The results of our survey 
shed new light on the role of lead candidates in EP election campaigns. They ad-
dress the relevance of these candidates from the voters’ perspective, rather than 
from that of parties. In our survey, we asked respondents to identify the six offi-
cial lead candidates along with the European party group responsible for their 
nomination. If voters were unable to establish a relationship between candidates 





Table 1.  The role of lead candidates 
Candidates Austria Germany France UK Sweden Average 
Manfred WEBER 30.31 33.69 4.8 2.68 7.23 15.74 
Frans TIMMERMANS 21.89 28.05 2.44 1.99 10.92 13.06 
Ska KELLER 10.66 21.49 3.5 2.07 8 9.14 
Margrethe VESTAGER 10.27 20.88 3.01 1.76 7.54 8.69 
Nico CUÉ 7.34 10.9 3.5 2.38 7.08 6.24 
Jan ZAHRADIL 6.45 10.52 1.87 2.07 6.77 5.54 
Average 14.49 20.92 3.19 2.16 7.92 - 
Note: In each country we asked the following question ‘For each of the following candidates for President of 
the next European Commission, can you tell me which European party group supports their nomination?’ 
The table shows the percentage of correct answers. 
The results shown in Table 1 reveal that lead candidates’ performance was again 
disappointing in this regard. On average, only 15 per cent of voters were able to 
correctly identify Manfred Weber, the lead candidate of the European People’s 
Party (EPP), with his European party group. The other candidates’ values are 
even lower. For the candidate of the second major party family (S&D), the Dutch 
Social Democrat Frans Timmermans, the results show an average of 13 per cent; 
and for the candidate of the Liberals (ALDE), Margrethe Verstager, the average 
value was 9 per cent. 3  
Our data also show considerable variation across countries. Regardless of party 
family, the relevance of lead candidates was strongest in Germany, where about 
20 per cent of voters were able to correctly identify the lead candidates. This 
cannot be attributed directly to the German lead candidate Manfred Weber. His 
results do not stand out in his ‘home country’ – only one-third of German voters 
correctly identified him with his European party group. The results for the other 
                                                 
3 The Liberal party group (ALDE) nominated a team of candidates. We included the most prominent member 
of this team, Margrethe Verstager, in our survey.  
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candidates indicate that the lead candidates in general received more attention 
in Germany. 
Most importantly, our data reveal that lead candidates had serious difficulties to 
connect to voters in three of the five countries, with average values clearly be-
low 10 per cent. Such a poor result should have been expected for the UK, which 
was already an exceptional case in 2014. However, the results for France are 
similarly disappointing. On average, only 3 per cent of French voters correctly 
identified the candidates, and less than 5 per cent were able to identify the al-
leged ‘winner’ of the electoral competition, Manfred Weber. In Sweden, the aver-
age value was about 8 per cent, and the individual value for Manfred Weber 
(7.23) was even below average.  
These results change only slightly if we focus on the lead candidates of the four 
major party groups and exclude the radical left and radical right candidates. In 
Germany, the average value increases from 21 to 25 per cent; in Austria, there is 
an increase from 15 to 18 per cent. However, the average values for the other 
three countries do not change at all. Even if we split the sample between those 
who voted for the party of the respective candidate and those who did not, as 
shown by Table A.3 in the appendix, the results remain disappointing for the 
Spitzenkandidaten process. In Germany, among the voters of the Christian Demo-
cratic parties CSU and CDU, 58 per cent could not correctly identify Weber as the 
lead candidate of the EPP. Most strikingly, more than 90 per cent of moderate 
right voters in France (voters of LR) and in Sweden (voters of the Moderates or 
Christian Democrats) could not place Weber as the EPP’s Spitzenkandidat. Though 
Weber is used here as the main example, the same findings could be drawn from 
the other candidates, with even more disappointing results. 
These results corroborate several findings for the role of the lead candidates in 
the EP election campaign in 2014. First, countries had large differences in their 
public awareness of Spitzenkandidaten (Hobolt 2014). The greatest awareness was 
found in German-speaking countries, and it was lowest in the UK (Schulze 2016; 
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Shackleton 2017); additionally, the awareness of the Spitzenkandidaten was 
greatest in their own countries (Hobolt 2014). Second, citizens’ knowledge of in-
dividual candidates was poor, and the lead candidates overall had limited name 
recognition (van der Brug, Gattermann, and de Vreese 2016; Schmitt, Hobolt, and 
Popa 2015). 
Evidently, the EP election campaign in 2019 was not different in this regard. 
Across the five countries covered by our study, only a small percentage of voters 
were actually able to correctly identify the candidates along with the European 
party group they were supposed to ‘lead’ and represent. In some major countries, 
most importantly in France, lead candidates were unable to connect to voters. 
Our findings suggest that the democratic legitimacy of these candidates was in 
fact low – if voters legitimized them at all. Their capability to provide their Eu-
ropean party groups with a democratic mandate for their nomination in subse-
quent negotiations among and within European institutions was very limited. In 
a nutshell, in 2019, the lead candidates failed during the election campaign – 
and not in post-electoral negotiations. 
 
Did voters care about Europe? The most important issues for voters in the 
2019 EP election 
If voters did not care about the lead candidates, did they care about issues? And 
if so, which issues were most important for voters during this election cam-
paign? The literature on party competition assumes that issues play a crucial 
role in election campaigns. Parties seek a competitive advantage by either selec-
tively emphasizing specific issues, as assumed by saliency theories of issue vot-
ing (see Robertson 1976; Budge and Farlie 1983), or by strategically positioning 
themselves towards the most relevant issues, as assumed by spatial theories of 
party competition (see Downs 1957). According to this literature, issue competi-
tion can and should be focused on a limited set of issues of high priority for vot-
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ers. A debate exists as to whether issue-oriented party competition is still rooted 
in a limited number of theoretically justified cleavages or whether these cleav-
ages have given way to a more fluid system of issue competition (see Kriesi et al. 
2008; 2012; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Green-Pedersen 2019). In any case, issue 
competition tends to become ineffective if voter priorities are diffuse and their 
positions are blurred. 
European elections provide some additional challenges for parties in this regard. 
One of the questions confronting parties is whether they should emphasize Eu-
ropean issues or stay with the domestic issues with which they are associated. 
The literature shows that mainstream parties have quite consistently and suc-
cessfully tried to avoid European issues in most EP elections (van der Eijk and 
Franklin 1996). The salience of European issues has been increasing in more re-
cent elections, but this does not indicate a shift of emphasis from the national to 
the European level. Meanwhile, this also reflects the fact that European issues 
have become more visible and politicizing in national elections (Hutter and 
Grande 2014; Hobolt and de Vries 2015). De Vreese and van der Brug (2016, 282) 
summarize this literature by concluding that ‘real European policies, such as the 
austerity measures imposed on southern European countries, are barely men-
tioned during election campaigns. Election mandates for those policies can only 
materialize to the extent that the behaviour of both EP parties and voters is 
shaped by the same ideological left/right dimension’. 
How relevant were European issues for voters in the 2019 EP election? And how 
were these issues integrated in their ideological orientations? The results of our 
survey contribute to answering these questions. Table 2 presents the results for 
the ‘most important issues’ question in our questionnaire. Respondents were 
asked to identify the two most important issues presently facing the European 
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Union from an extended list of issues.4 Four findings are of particularly im-
portant. First, our data shows that two issues clearly stood out: immigration and 
climate change. Immigration was one of the two most important issues in each 
of the five countries for more than 20 per cent of the respondents. Climate 
change was among the two most important issues in four of the five countries. 
Only in the UK was terrorism mentioned as a more important problem than cli-
mate change, which was third. 
Second, European issues were important for voters in the 2019 EP elections. In 
our questionnaire, we included four issues related to the EU and European inte-
gration: on the single currency, the power and competences of EU institutions, 
on European values and identity, and on the role of the EU in the international 
scene. While most policy issues also have a European dimension, these issues are 
exclusively related to European institutions and the European integration pro-
cess. The individual European issues were clearly outperformed by the two most 
important policy issues. Most remarkable are the low values for the single cur-
rency, the euro. It is hardly mentioned as an important issue, regardless of a 
country’s membership in the Eurozone. However, two European issues gained 
considerable importance, namely the role of the EU in the international scene 
and European values and identity. These issues were mentioned more frequently 
than most of the other policy issues. These values suggest that voters really 
cared about the state of the EU and considered European issues as important in 
this election. The aggregate values for the four European issues support this in-
terpretation. The aggregate value was 24.96% in Germany, 24.01% in Austria, 
22.21% in France and even 29.98% in the UK. Sweden deviated from this pattern 
with an aggregate value of 10.11%. 
  
                                                 
4 This question is distinct from the ‘most important issues’ question in the European Election Study (EES) 
because it asks for challenges facing the EU, rather than the respondent’s country, and by allowing two 
issues to be mentioned, instead of one. 
 
10 
Table 2.  The issue priorities of voters: What are the two most important issues 
currently facing the European Union? 
Issues Austria Germany France UK Sweden 
The single currency, the Euro 2.59 2.79 3.06 5.65 1.08 
The power and competences of EU institutions 5.46 5.19 6.32 8.65 2.21 
European values and identity 7.98 7.48 4.97 7.15 3.41 
The role of the EU in the international scene 7.98 9.5 7.86 8.53 3.41 
Immigration 
 
22.32 22.63 22.13 21.56 24.77 
The fight against climate change 
 
22.64 23.24 14.63 10.99 25.04 
Economic growth 3.35 3.17 7.17 8.19 5.73 
Inflation and purchasing power 3.07 1.98 7.21 2.77 1.16 
Unemployment 4.02 2.67 5.42 4.04 2.59 
Crime 4.44 4.31 1.02 2.5 10.33 
Terrorism 6.16 7.52 8.6 13.03 9.48 
Agriculture 1.47 .95 3.1 .69 2.28 
The future of pensions 3.64 3.78 2.49 1.19 1.47 
The food safety 1.85 1.34 1.39 1.46 1.86 
The energy 1.92 2.48 3.71 1.58 3.06 
Misc. 1.12 0.95 0.94 2.04 2.13 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: Numbers indicate the percentage of how often each issue was selected for each country. Bold numbers 
indicate the most important issues per country. 
 
The importance of European issues becomes even more evident when compared 
with economic issues. Our questionnaire included three economic issues, name-
ly unemployment, economic growth and inflation. These issues were considered 
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minor problems for the European Union at the time of the election. Economic 
issues in sum were less important for voters in Austria (10.44%), Sweden (9.48%) 
and in Germany (7.82%). Aggregate values of economic issues are highest in 
France with 19.8% and in the UK with 15%. Even including the single currency in 
this category of economic issues, this picture does not dramatically change. 
Third, this pattern is quite consistent across countries. In the five North Western 
European countries covered by our study, voters were mostly concerned about 
the same problems, and more or less to the same extent. This is particularly the 
case in Austria, France and Germany but also in Sweden. Even the UK was not as 
different as we would have expected against the background of domestic Brexit 
controversies. Our findings support the conclusions of Russo et al. (2019, 11) that 
the 2019 EP elections, ‘perhaps for the first time, show some genuine issue con-
tent that is readable across multiple countries’.  
Fourth, the pattern of issues emphasized by voters seems to reflect the recent 
transformation of cleavage structures in Western Europe. Among the most im-
portant issues for voters in this EP election, those constituting the new ‘demar-
cation–integration’ (Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012) or ‘transnationalism’ cleavage 
(Hooghe and Marks 2018) played an important role. This applies particularly for 
immigration and European integration issues. These ‘twin issues’ have been the 
main drivers of transformative change in Western European national electoral 
arenas since the 1990s, and voters attributed high importance to them in the 
2019 EP election contest as well. The aggregate share of these issues was 46.33% 
in Austria, 47.59% in Germany, 44.34% in France, 51.54% in the UK and 35.88% in 
Sweden. 
How does climate change fit into this picture? Conflicts over environmental is-
sues have not been among the constitutive issues of the new ‘transnationalism’ 
cleavage, but they may have a strong transnational dimension. Global environ-
mental issues such as climate change have been responsible for the emergence 
of ‘world risk society’ (Beck 2009; 2016) and of new institutional frameworks of 
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global governance. Hence, there are good theoretical reasons to subsume con-
flicts over climate change under the new ‘transnationalism’ cleavage. Moreover, 
positive attitudes towards environmental issues have been an integral part of 
green, alternative and libertarian values. Accordingly, environmental issues 
have been included in the category of ’new cultural’ issues in the most recent 
study by Hutter and Kriesi (2019). However, recent domestic political conflicts, 
particularly the gilet jaunes movement in France, have also revealed a strong 
economic dimension of such conflicts. As a result, they may also be embedded 
into the socio-economic cleavage. In our view, how conflicts over climate change 
are integrated into the existing conflict structure is an empirical question. This 
will very much depend on the system of political opposition between competing 
parties, on the one hand, and the social groups constituted by these conflicts, on 
the other hand. 
 
The structure of voters’ issue positions in the 2019 EP elections 
Having shown that voters had clear issue priorities, we now turn to their posi-
tions on these issues. Which positions did voters take on the most important is-
sues? And, most importantly, were their positions meaningfully structured 
across a larger number of issues? In order to identify the voters’ issue positions, 
we asked them to position themselves on a scale from 0 to 10 on a broad range 
of issues. Among them were several European issues, but the list also includes 
questions on welfare (‘redistribution’), immigration, the environment and cul-
tural liberalism (‘homosexual rights’). The full list of questions and their exact 
wording are documented in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
Although this list of questions is not fully identical to those issues included in 
our ‘most important issues’ question, it includes all issues which are considered 
constitutive for both the old socio-economic cleavage and the new ‘demarca-
tion–integration’ divide. Are voter positions on these ‘cleavage issues’ structured 
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accordingly? Do they reflect the divides discussed in the literature on conflict 
structuring in Europe? And can we find the same structure in every country 
covered by our survey?  





















EU authority over budget 0.745 
  
0.370 
EU strictness on rule violation 0.679 
  
0.498 
EU tax on its own 0.648 
  
0.505 
EU security and defence 0.713 
  
0.479 
EU minimum wage  0.555 0.526 
EU should dissolve  0.750  0.359 
Redistribution   0.814 0.336 









Note: Blanks represent abs(loading)<.5. Factors with Eigenvalue>1. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy: .76. Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances. Phrasing of the questions for 
each variable can be found in section A.2 in the appendix, table A.2. 
We used factor analysis to answer these questions. Our analysis was based on the 
assumption that issues constituting a cleavage should load on the same factor. 
The results of our analysis are shown in Table 3. The analysis identified three 
factors. The first factor includes four EU specific issues, among them EU authori-
ty over national budgets and EU strictness on rule violations. Basically, these 
issues are about the EU’s authority vis-à-vis member states. We may interpret 
this as an EU authority dimension, which is somewhat similar to the ‘Europeanist 
camp’ identified by Maag and Kriesi (2016, 221) in their analysis of European 
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integration debates. The second factor includes two EU issues but also immigra-
tion. Why are theseissues grouped together? The two EU issues address general 
orientations towards the European integration process, i.e. fundamental ques-
tions of ‘integration vs. demarcation’. In these questions, we asked whether ‘Eu-
ropean integration has gone too far’ and whether ’The European Union should 
dissolve’. As the values for both questions were very positive, we may interpret 
these two issues as representing the ‘Eurosceptic camp’ in conflicts over Europe. 
These two issues were combined with very negative positions on immigration, 
which suggests that the second factor represents the cultural-identitarian core 
of the new demarcation–integration cleavage. The third factor includes two socio-
economic policy issues, namely ‘European minimum wage’, as a proxy for a ‘so-
cial Europe’, and ‘redistribution’. Both issues stand more generally for pro-
welfare issues. It seems as if this factor represents a socio-economic dimension of 
conflict. Interestingly, environmental issues are also positively correlated with 
this factor. Therefore, it would be misleading to equate this factor with the ‘old’ 
socio-economic divide. Instead, this structure of voter preferences signifies a 
transformation of the socio-economic cleavage into something we may tenta-
tively label a new ‘socio-ecological divide’. 
How robust is this constellation of factors across countries? We observed some 
cross-national variation in our analysis of issue priorities. For example, eco-
nomic issues were much more important for French voters, while European is-
sues were of minor relevance for Swedish voters. Hence, our factor analysis may 
mask differences between countries. In order to control this, we calculated fac-
tor analyses for each country separately. The results (shown in Tables A.4-8 in 
the Appendix) provide strong support for our previous analysis. Most important-
ly, we found the same three factors in every country, with the same minor mod-
ifications. First, the Europeanists also share positive opinions about a European 
minimum wage in all countries (except Germany). Second, the demarcation–
integration factor includes negative opinions towards homosexual rights in all 
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countries, which indicates that this factor even more markedly represents the 
new cleavage than suggested by our aggregate-level analysis. Third, the envi-
ronmental issue loads more or less to the same extent on the third factor in eve-
ry country, regardless of the relative importance of economic issues. This factor 
is also positively correlated with homosexual rights, which reaffirms our hunch 
regarding the transformation of the old socio-economic divide. 
Taken together, our findings show that voters in the 2019 EP elections had clear 
issue priorities and that their positions on these issues, to a considerable extent, 
reflected the new cleavage structure, which has been shaping party competition 
in North Western European countries in the last two decades. 
 
The self-placement of voters in the ideological space 
If our assumption holds that voters’ issue priorities are shaped by fundamental 
political divides, then these divides should also correspond to voters’ general 
political orientations. How do voters ideologically position themselves? And how 
do their issue positions correspond with their general ideological orientations? 
Our questionnaire included two questions which allowed these questions to be 
answered. First, we asked respondents to place themselves on the common polit-
ical left–right scale. Although this scale assumes a comprehensive coverage of 
issues, it is based on socio-economic conflicts (see, e.g., Laver and Budge 1992). 
We therefore took it as a proxy for socio-economic divides. Since our previous 
results suggest that voters in the 2019 EP elections were also divided by a new 
‘demarcation-integration’ cleavage, we used a second question to examine the 
relevance of this divide for voters’ political self-placement. More precisely, the 
respondents were asked about their general orientation towards European inte-
gration. In the following, we take their placement on a ‘pro-/anti-EU’ scale as 
indicator for their transnational orientation. The literature on the restructuring 
of political conflict in Western Europe assumes that these two dimensions con-
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stitute a two-dimensional political space and that voters’ placement in this two-
dimensional space is structured in a specific way (see Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012). 
In Figure 1, we show the correlation between the two dimensions for each coun-
try. Our analysis reveals some variation across countries. Basically, we can iden-
tify three patterns of self-placements. In Sweden, voters’ self-placement in the 
two-dimensional space was dominated by the left–right divide. Their positions 
towards the EU were not systematically affected by their left–right orientations. 
This is in clear contrast to the other four countries, in which left and right ori-
entations and pro-/anti-EU positions were associated in specific ways. The pre-
vailing pattern was the one we observed in Austria, the UK and Germany. In 
these countries, most pronounced in Austria, left orientations corresponded 
with a pro-EU position, and a right placement clearly corresponded with an anti-
EU position. The result is a GAL-TAN divide, as Hooghe and Marks identified in 
their work on the ideological profiles of political parties towards European inte-
gration in the early 2000s (see, e.g., Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). This divide 
is constituted by political oppositions between green, alternative and libertarian 
parties and ideological positions, on the one hand, and traditional, authoritarian 
and nationalist orientations, on the other hand. The GAL pole in this system of 
oppositions is represented by the New Left and Green parties, while the TAN pole 
is most successfully represented by radical right populist parties. The self-
placement of voters in Austria, the UK and Germany is clearly shaped by this 
system of political opposition. 
A modification of the GAL–TAN divide can be found in countries with a strong 
radical left. As shown by Hix and Lord (1997), the radical left shares with the 
radical and extreme right their opposition towards the EU and the European in-
tegration process. While voters of the radical left and radical right parties occu-
py different positions on socio-economic issues, the placement of these voters in 
the two-dimensional space takes the shape of an inverted U curve. In our analy-
sis, the self-placement of voters in France shows this pattern of political conflict.  
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Figure 1.  Self-placement of voters on Pro/Anti EU versus Left/Right scales per 
country 
 
Note: This plot shows the correlation between individuals’ position on the left-right scale and pro/anti-EU 
scale. Dots represent individuals in each square (jittered). Solid lines are local regressions with 95% C.I. 
Exact wording of the questions can be found in section A.2 in the appendix, in table A.2. 
How do these ideological self-placements relate to voters’ positions on their 
most important issues, as we identified above? In the last step, we correlated the 
self-placement of voters with the factor loadings, which we present in Table 3. 
The results for each of the three factors are shown separately for left and right 
orientations (Figure 2a) and for pro-/anti-EU orientations (Figure 2b). They clear-
ly confirm the findings of our previous analysis. Most importantly, our demarca-
tion–integration factor is correlated with both left–right and pro-/anti-EU posi-
tions in the expected way. 
More specifically, the extremes on the left–right scale tended to be negatively 
correlated with the EU-authority factor, though for different reasons:  
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Figure 2a.  Issue priorities and political self-placement — Left-Right on factor 
loadings 
 
Figure 2b. Pro/Anti EU on factor loadings 
 
Note: Dark lines illustrate the predicted probabilities of left-right scale (figure 2a) and pro/anti-EU scale 
(figure 2b) on the factor loadings in Table 3. Vertical lines illustrate the density of the scales for each cate-
gory. Wording on the questions can be found in section A.2 in the Appendix. 
 
while the left is strongly opposed to strengthening security and defence in the 
EU, the right is much less supportive of granting the EU authority over national 
budgets. Yet, this dimension is positively correlated with being pro-EU in gen-
eral. The integration–demarcation factor displays the clearest polarization 
structure: opposition to immigration aligns with opposition to the EU as a polity, 
thus aligning the right with anti-EU stands. Finally, the new socio-ecological 
factor shows a very clear divide between the left and the right: the left tends to 
favour redistribution, a European minimum wage and environmental protection, 
 
19 
whereas the right shows clear opposition to each of these issues. However, it is 
important to note that this factor is uncorrelated with support for the EU. 
In sum, the analysis confirms our expectation that voters’ issue priorities and 
preferences in the EP elections systematically corresponded to their general 
ideological orientations. Most importantly, these ideological orientations reflect 
the cleavage structures identified above, which have been characteristic for the 
system of political oppositions in the EU party system (Hix and Lord 1997; Hix 
and Høyland 2011). 
 
Conclusions 
Our survey results provide interesting new insights into the demand side of 
electoral competition in the EU. Three findings are particularly important. First, 
our findings show that the latest EP elections were not a vote for the Spitzenkan-
didaten. In the 2019 EP election campaign, European party groups were unable to 
establish an effective electoral connection with their voters via the Spitzenkan-
didaten. Second, our analysis shows that European voters had clear issue priori-
ties and positions. These issue preferences were quite similar across the coun-
tries covered by our survey. Our analysis of the demand side of European elec-
tions suggests that there would have been considerable potential for transna-
tional political campaigns in the 2019 EP elections. As a next step, it will be im-
portant to determine whether and how political parties were able and willing to 
exploit this potential in these elections, i.e. whether supply actually met this 
demand. Third, and most importantly, voters’ issue preferences reflect the new 
structure of political divides as we know it from national elections in West Euro-
pean countries, and these preferences evidently correspond with their more 
general ideological orientations. Our analysis suggests that the demand side of 
the EP elections in 2019 was shaped considerably by the new ‘demarcation–
 
20 
integration’ or ‘transnationalism’ cleavage. This was not only due to the im-
portance of European issues in the EP elections; even more so, it was the result 
of the increasing relevance of immigration issues for European voters. It will be 
a matter of further analyses to explore the consequences of this structuring of 
issue preferences for voting behaviour. 
Against this background, we should be cautious in interpreting the election re-
sults as an unqualified vote for Europe. The higher importance of European is-
sues for voters in the 2019 EP elections should not be interpreted as a return to 
the permissive consensus of the pre-Maastricht decades in the 2019 EP elections. 
Our analysis suggests that increasing interest in European issues could also be 
the result of new political divides and controversies in the electorate. Hence, the 
consequences of higher public attention for Europe for the future direction of 
the European integration process could be more ambiguous than assumed in 
public debates. It seems as if EP elections have become more mobilizing again – 
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A.1 Technical Details of the Survey 
Geographical scope of the survey: Austria, Germany, France, Sweden and the Unit-
ed Kingdom. 
Universe: individuals residing in the area of study older than 18. Size and distri-
bution of the sample: 1.567 interviews in Austria, 1.312 in Germany, 1.230 in 
France, 1.300 in Sweden, and 1.304 in the United Kingdom. The selection of re-
spondents was based on socio-demographic variables (i.e. age and gender) strati-
fied according to region (NUTS 2). 
Sampling error: for a confidence level of 95.5% (as is usually adopted) and assum-
ing the principles of simple random sampling, in the worst‐case scenario of 
maximum uncertainty (p = q = 50%), the sampling error corresponding to the 
data on the total sample is approx. ±3 percentage points. 
Method of collecting information: online survey, using structured and pre‐coded 
questions. The task was carried out by Respondi, using their databank of re-
spondents. The questionnaire is available in German (Germany and Austria), 
French (France), Swedish (Sweden) and English (UK).  
Interview dates: All interviews were conducted in the aftermath of the May 2019 
EP elections, specifically: Austria (31/05/2019 – 24/06/2019), Germany 
(31/05/2019 – 12/06/2019), France (31/05/2019 – 12/06/2019), Sweden 





A.2 Survey Questions 
Table A.1. Wording of questions used for Table 3 
Issue Question 
Introduction 
We would like to ask you to position yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 means that you are ‘strongly against the statement’ and 10 means 
that you are ‘strongly in favour of the statement’. If your views are some-
where in between, you can choose any number that describes your position 
best. 
European Unification European Unification has gone too far 
EU authority over 
budget 
The EU should have more authority over the EU Member States' eco-
nomic and budgetary policies 
EU strictness on rule 
violation 
The EU should severely punish Member States that violate rules (e.g. EU 
deficit) 
EU tax on its own The EU should have the right to levy taxes on its own 
EU security and de-
fence The EU should strengthen its security and defence policy 
EU minimum wage There should be a European Minimum Wage 
EU should dissolve The European Union should dissolve 
Redistribution Redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor 
Homosexual rights The legalization of same-sex marriages is a good thing 
Immigration 
Migration from non-European countries should be restricted as much as 
possible 
Environment 
Environmental protection should always take priority even at the cost 
of economic growth 
 
Table A.2. Wording of questions used for Figure 2 
Variable Question 
Left-Right Scale 
In politics people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Using the scale 
below, where would you place yourself, where 0 means ‘extreme left’ 
and 10 means ‘extreme right’? 
 
Pro/Anti-EU 
In European politics people sometimes talk of being ‘pro-EU’ and ‘anti-
EU’. Using the scale below, where would you place yourself, where 0 




A.3 Additional Figures and Tables 
Table A.3. Placement of lead candidates by country and EP group voted for in the EP 2019 elections 
Pct. Correct Answers Austria  Germany  France  Sweden  United Kingdom 
 Voted for party?   Voted for party?  Voted for party?  Voted for party?  Voted for party? 
 
No Yes Dif.  No Yes Dif.  No Yes Dif.  No Yes Dif.  No Yes Dif. 
EPP: Manfred WEBER 






4.65 7.35 -2.7 
 
7.27 6.58 0.69 
 
No EPP party 
PES: Frans TIMMERMANS 






2.22 6.56 -4.34 
 
11.6 6.91 4.69 
 
2.01 1,79 0.22 
EGP: Ska KELLER 






3.2 6.67 -3.47 
 
7.27 13.89 -6.62 
 
2.11 1.43 0.68 
ALDE: Margrethe VESTAGER 






2.21 7.37 -5.16 
 
7.51 7.75 -0.24 
 
1.51 4.42 -2.91 
EL: Nico CUÉ 






3.36 7.32 -3.96 
 
6.56 13.68 -7.12 
 
No EL party 
ACRE: Jan ZAHRADIL No ACRE party  No ACRE party  No ACRE party  6.3 10.13 -3.83  2.15 0 2.15 
 16.63 29.09 -12.46   22.10 31.04 
-
8.95 
  3.13 7.05 -3.93   7.75 9.82 -2.07   1.95 1.95 0.03 
Notes: Categories below 5 observations in red. Groups include the following parties:  
EPP: ÖVP (AT), CDU/CSU (DE), Les Republicans (FR), Moderate Party and Christian Democrats (SE). 
PES: SPÖ (AT), SPD (DE), PS (FR), SAP (SE), Labour (UK) 
EGP: Grüne (AT), Bündis/Die Grünen (DE), Veerts (FR), Green Party (SE), Greens (UK). 
ALDE: NEOS (AT), FPD (DE), REM (FR), Liberals and Center Party (SE), LibDem (UK). 
EL: Linke (DE), La France Insoumise (FR), Left Party (SE). 
ACRE: Sweden Democrats (SE), Conservatives (UK). Note that neither FPÖ, nor AfD or the FN are together in the ACRE party group.
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Table A.4. The structure of voters’ issue positions in Austria 















EU authority over budget 0.725 
  
0.397 
EU strictness on rule violation 0.662 
  
0.505 
EU tax on its own 0.674 
  
0.464 
EU security and defence 0.736 
  
0.436 
EU minimum wage 0.320  0.580 0.556 
EU should dissolve -0.355 0.695  0.388 
Redistribution   0.792 0.370 









Note: Blanks represent abs(loading)<.3. Factors with Eigenvalue>1. Rotated factor loadings 
(pattern matrix) and unique variances. Phrasing of the questions for each variable can be 
found in section A.2 in the appendix, table A.2. 
 
Table A.5. The structure of voters’ issue positions in Germany 















EU authority over budget 0.686 
  
0.400 
EU strictness on rule violation 0.709 
  
0.474 
EU tax on its own 0.572 
  
0.522 
EU security and defence 0.753 
  
0.424 
EU minimum wage  0.616 0.532 
EU should dissolve -0.303 0.732  0.363 
Redistribution   0.802 0.353 









Note: Blanks represent abs(loading)<.3. Factors with Eigenvalue>1. Rotated factor loadings 
(pattern matrix) and unique variances. Phrasing of the questions for each variable can be 
found in section A.2 in the appendix, table A.2. 
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Table A.6.  The structure of voters’ issue positions in France 















EU authority over budget 0.839 
  
0.269 
EU strictness on rule violation 0.793 
  
0.371 
EU tax on its own 0.676 
  
0.513 
EU security and defence 0.564 0.377 
 
0.515 
EU minimum wage 0.347  0.575 0.549 
EU should dissolve  0.705  0.448 
Redistribution   0.758 0.399 









Note: Blanks represent abs(loading)<.3. Factors with Eigenvalue>1. Rotated factor loadings 
(pattern matrix) and unique variances. Phrasing of the questions for each variable can be 
found in section A.2 in the appendix, table A.2. 
 
Table A.7.  The structure of voters’ issue positions in Sweden 















EU authority over budget 0.725 
  
0.418 
EU strictness on rule violation 0.497 
  
0.651 
EU tax on its own 0.723 
  
0.451 
EU security and defence 0.573 
 
-0.439 0.434 
EU minimum wage 0.610 0.372 0.482 
EU should dissolve  0.831  0.284 
Redistribution   0.822 0.315 
Homosexual rights  -0.598 0.333 0.531 
Immigration 
 




Note: Blanks represent abs(loading)<.3. Factors with Eigenvalue>1. Rotated factor loadings 
(pattern matrix) and unique variances. Phrasing of the questions for each variable can be 
found in section A.2 in the appendix, table A.2. 
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Table A.8.  The structure of voters’ issue positions in UK 















EU authority over budget 0.762 
  
0.343 
EU strictness on rule violation 0.721 
  
0.458 
EU tax on its own 0.769 
  
0.351 
EU security and defence 0.644 
  
0.522 
EU minimum wage 0.523 0.525 0.440 
EU should dissolve  0.841  0.242 
Redistribution   0.753 0.418 









Note: Blanks represent abs(loading)<.3. Factors with Eigenvalue>1. Rotated factor loadings 
(pattern matrix) and unique variances. Phrasing of the questions for each variable can be 
found in section A.2 in the appendix, table A.2. 
